As the IT framework deepened and elevated to the status of the new norm of global orthodoxy, new institutional mechanisms were also devised such as establishing a "monetary policy board" with a pre-announced meeting calendar, and open public display of the board's meetings along with the disclosure of voting behavior of its members to "facilitate transparency" of the bank's intentions. In this vein, many developing countries have changed their central bank laws in order to decrease the influence of democratically elected governments on central banks (CBs).
Along this trend, the orthodox approach has continued to exclusively emphasize indirect, market based instruments, such as short term interest rates, as the primary tool of monetary policy. (Masson, et. al., 1997) .
2 Given this exclusive focus on price stability via interest rate responses, however, there had been a concomitant common observation that historical responses of the nominal interest rates to shocks had been significantly more gradual and sticky than the optimal policies called for by the efficiency rules. To account for this fact, some authors noted a revealed desire on the part of the IT-central banks to smooth their rates of interest over and beyond the generally stated objective of achieving price stability. Thus, the aforementioned desire for interest rate smoothing has gradually surfaced out as the main underlying motive of the modern CBs under the age of financial globalization.
Consequently, in an attempt to secure investor confidence and credibility, the CBs came to be increasingly constrained to maintain a high and constant rate of interest in their operations. It is the purpose of this paper to document evidence to this fact from a newly "emerging market economy", Turkey.
Turkey's recent macroeconomic history provides an interesting case study in the IT literature with its prolonged experience of persistent, inertial and moderately high rates of inflation (at around a plateau of 60-70% per annum) and highly volatile cyclical boom-bust growth episodes. Turkey has completed its capital account deregulation in 1989, and in the 2 Note, for instance, the Bank of England's policy mandate: "One of the Bank of England's two core purposes is monetary stability (the "other" core purpose is financial stability -authors' note). Monetary stability means stable prices -low inflation-and confidence in the currency. Stable prices are defined by the Government's inflation target, which the Bank seeks to meet through the decisions on interest rates taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. (www.bankofengland.co.
uk). (Emphases ours).
3 See, e.g., Srour (2001) ; Lowe and Ellis (1998) , Sack (1998a Sack ( , 1998b Drew and Plentier (2000) , Mehra (2001) , Benhabib and Uribe (2003) , and Woodford (2002) for a detailed analysis of measuring the interest rate smoothing. In its most succinct form, the argument is that monetary authorities are assumed to minimize a loss function of the form: β 1 var(y t ) + β 2 var(P t ) + β 3 var(i t -i t-1 ) where y t is real output; P t is the price level; and i t is the interest rate instrument. Var(.) denotes the variance of the associated variables, and β 1 , β 2 , β 3 are positive coefficients. relatively short time span since then it had experienced no less than three major economic crises.
The In what follows, in this paper we seek to provide evidence to the following questions:
How did the CBRT's policy objectives and strategic instruments evolve since the onset of capital account liberalization? What were the main determinants of the Bank's interest rates? In particular, has IT changed the responsiveness of the CBRT to different macroeconomic indicators?
To this end, we utilize a central bank reaction function framework which, in some ways, can be seen as an expanded Taylor Rule regression, over 1994 -2007 . Here our aim is not to reveal the CBRT's official monetary policy rules per se, but rather to document in an ex post sense the behavior of the CBRT under its official guidelines and responses against the conditionalities imposed by the international finance community. We find that over such an extended time horizon during when significant shifts in the macroeconomic environment have occurred, the CBRT's almost exclusive focus on "interest rate smoothing" has not changed; and that CBRT has not shown any response to swings in the business cycles. This raises the question whether there is a deeper underlying structural constraint, binding the CBRT's alleged "instrument-independence" in its conduct of monetary policy. We trace the basics of this structural constraint to the nature of the global financial system restricting the ability of the central banks to pursue "independent" policy objectives.
The remaining pages of the paper are organized in four additional sections. Next, we provide a brief overview of the literature on interest rate smoothing to be followed by a short monetary history of Turkey since full capital account liberalization. We implement our econometric estimations in section four. Finally section five summarizes and concludes.
II: Empirical Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing
There is now a significant body of accumulated empirical evidence suggesting that CBs tend to change their policy interest rates only gradually; and that, they reveal even greater reluctance to (Woodford 2002) . Some claim interest rate smoothing can decrease the volatility and contribute to stability under certain conditions (Benhabib and Uribe, 2003) . In this vein, Woodford (2002:2) claims that "a concern with interest rate smoothing on the part of a central bank can have desirable consequences. This is because such an objective can result in history-dependent central bank behavior which, when anticipated by the private sector, can serve the bank's stabilization objectives through the effects upon current outcomes of anticipated future policy." In contrast, however, one might also argue that in many cases it can also be interpreted as an indication of "constrained/passive" central banking. This would be the case especially if other economic variables are not claimed significant in explaining movements in the central banks' interest rates.
Several theoretical explanations had been advanced to account for this phenomenon. The first is based on arguments of attaining and maintaining "credibility" in an uncertain and often hostile world of international finance. Monetary authorities often find it more effective to commit to a given level of its main instrument -the interest rate over extended periods of time rather than creating the image that "they are lost in the dark". 5 Third, the threat of capital flight in an uncertain domain warrants the CBs to follow "predictable" rules. In order to reduce the risks associated with increased financialization (See, among others, Crotty, 2005; Epstein, 2005; Stiglitz, 2000 and Grabel, 1995) , the CBs are often committed to follow simple and well-4 Similarly, Drew and Plentier (2003: 3) argues that "in general terms models that are typically used by researchers … normally suggest fairly rapid and aggressive responses of short term interest rates, even under a flexible approach". 5 From a different perspective, Caplin and Leahy (1996) advance a similar motivation. They argue that policymakers do not like frequent and sudden interest rate changes because they do not want to give an impression that they are poorly informed.
defined rules in the name of accountability and transparency. 6 Fearing that they would lose credibility, the CBs often prefer to follow smooth interest rate paths, even if "optimality rules"
from their econometric models suggest otherwise. Related with this is the relevant concern for avoiding financial instability. The CBs are conditioned by the markets to avoid frequent variations in its instruments that would cause large swings in asset prices and the financial rates of return. Such swings could cause insolvencies in public debt and might have a severe negative impact in the corporate balance sheets. For instance, Cukierman (1996) Conway (2000) and Greenspan (2003) , discussion of the impacts of uncertainty on central banking from a qualitative perspective. 8 One of the earliest discussion about the desirability of being cautious about monetary policy under uncertainty can be found in Brainard (1967 The real fact of life, however, has been quite a different story. Following full-fledged financial liberalization, those developing economies that underwent financial de-regulation found themselves trapped within high and persistent real interest rates. They also bore witness to a self-distorting foreign exchange market operating through attacks of speculative hot money flows into the fragile and shallow asset markets, luring the residents to over-zealous spending and excessive debt accumulation. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the post-liberalization episodes were inflicted with the divergence of domestic savings away from fixed capital investments towards speculative financial instruments with often erratic and volatile yields. In this milieu the need for so called credible policies , existing financial instability and uncertainty have increased.
Turkey has been one of the critical examples of such cases, given its mini cycles of (speculative) expansion-fragility-crisis episodes over its post-capital account liberalization in late 1989. It is to this subject we now turn.
concept can be unveiled. Krippner (2005:174) , in line with Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century defines it as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production. According to Epstein (2005: 3) "financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies". In what follows, in a broader way, we can consider financialization as a phenomenon which can be described by increasing financial motives, volume and impact of financial activities within and among countries.
III. Central Bank of Turkey under Post-Capital Account Liberalization
Turkey has completed its financial liberalization with full deregulation of the capital account in August, 1989 . Consequently, with the advent of elimination of controls on foreign capital transactions and the declaration of convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989, Turkey opened up its domestic asset markets to global financial competition. In this setting, the Central Bank had to abandon its traditional instruments of monetary control and had become directly liable to the speculative conditions of financial arbitrage in the global markets.
The immediate three year period after the 1989 reforms was marked with a virtual elimination of the "foreign exchange gap" which had crippled the Turkish macro balances for , 1994 and February, 2001 . In Boratav, Türel and Yeldan's (1995 words, "the post-1990 Turkish experience shows the serious problems confronting a developing economy which decides to move into full external and internal deregulation in the financial system under conditions of high inflation. The specter of capital flight becomes the dominant motive in policy-making and creates commitment to high interest rates and expectations for cheap foreign exchange. The links of these two policy variables with the real sphere of the economy, i.e. investment on physical capital and the current account balance of payments, are deeply severed. Instability in the rates of foreign exchange and interest rates creates feedbacks which lead the economy into further instability."
In Figure full-fledged inflation targeting. The Bank's current mandate is to set a "point" target of 5 percent inflation of the consumer prices. Given internal and external shocks, the Bank has recognized an internal (of 1 percent) and an external (of 2 percent) "uncertainty" band around the point target. Thus, the Bank will try to keep the inflation rate at its point target; however, recognizing a band of maximum 2 percentage points below or above the 5% target rate. The
Bank has announced that it will continue to use the overnight interest rates as its main policy tool to reach its target. It is stated explicitly that the "sole objective of the CBRT is to provide price stability", and that all other possible objectives are out of its policy realm.
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One of the earlier attempts to estimate an (implicit) monetary policy function of the CBRT is the seminal paper by Berument and Malatyali (2000) . Using a generalized form of a
Taylor-type reaction function over 1989.07 to 1997.03 Berument and Malatyali found that the CBRT has targeted M2Y growth, and that neither real nor nominal depreciation was sought for.
They also report that, over the 1990s, the CBRT has not targeted currency issued, M2, net domestic assets, or net foreign assets, nor has taken any of the budget deficit measures into account while determining its monetary policy. A similar result was also deduced by Kaya (2006) where within a generalized Taylor form of monetary policy rule, Kaya reports that none of the conventional macro aggregates yield a statistically significant explanation of the behavior of the CBRT's short term interest rate over the post-1990 period.
The above results were put into a further test in Berument and Tasci (2004) where the authors suggest that over the 1990s the CBRT has actually used the spread between the interbank rate and the rate of nominal depreciation as its main policy rate, rather than the simple short term interest rate. Considering monthly data over 1990.01 to 2000.10, Berument and Tasci found that the CBRT responded to its foreign exchange reserves, output and M2 growth;
and that it targeted neither the future, nor the lagged inflation rate. In other words, in the period immediate after capital account liberalization the CBRT was more concerned with stability of the markets rather than inflation. Us (2004 and Kaya's (2006) results.
IV. Econometrics of Interest Rate Smoothing
Given the above background, we now turn our attention to the investigation of how the CBRT has reacted to changes in the economic conditions from 1994 to present. For this purpose, we will benefit from a central bank reaction function framework, which, in some senses can be likened to a modified version of the Taylor Rule (TR) which was first proposed by John Taylor in 1993. The initial idea behind the TR was that central banks could set their interest rates by following a simple formula based on inflation and output gaps. Later, Taylor himself and many others elaborated on this simple rule (Taylor 1999, Hebbel and Werner 2002; McCalum and Nelson 2004 ) and at a more general level, it provided the backbone of the new monetary policy (see among others, Romer, 2002, and Setterfield, 2006) . In devising a TR-type monetary policy, Woglom (2003) directs our attention to the distinction between rules for policy targets and rules for policy instruments. While the former specifies "how the central bank will determine the value of its policy instrument such as the short term interest rate" (p. 200), the latter sets the broad objectives of monetary policy.
We thus hypothesize that a TR framework can be used to capture the changes in the responsiveness of the CBRT to different macroeconomic variables in its conduct of monetary policy. Before taking further steps, however, it has to be noted at the outset that we do not claim that the Turkish Central Bank has officially followed a variant of the TR. In other words, we do not aim at finding or disclosing a specific TR for the Turkish economy. Rather, our direct purpose is to check, ex post, which explanatory variables were significant in explaining the historically observed behavior of the Bank's interest rate from 1994 to the end of 2007. Hence our method joins the above authors in its usage of the Taylor rule, in that, rather than using it as a forward rule in setting the interest rate policy, we will utilize it to elucidate the CBRT's responses to changes in macroeconomic variables from 1994-2007. Furthermore, as we discuss below our reaction function specification is broader than the standard Taylor Rule type specifications.
IV-1. Data and Periodization
The period of our econometric analysis covers monthly observations on various macro prices where, R t (R t-1 ) stand for nominal short term interest rate at time t (t-1); π t-1 for inflation rate at time t-1; ygap t-1 for income gap at t-1; rdept t-1 for nominal exchange rate depreciation at time t-1; and fr t-1 for the federal reserve rate (US interest rate) at time t-1
The above model can be seen as an augmented TR equation. Some models use real interest rates as dependent variables instead of nominal rates. Although this method could be used, we think using nominal interest rates is much more relevant because changes in nominal interest rates are genuine responses of central banks given the fact that they cannot directly control the real rates. We specifically used overnight interest rates because it has been the Bank's main policy instrument. The CBRT started using its overnight (O/N) interest rate as the main policy instrument after 2002. However, the Bank used to maneuver its overnight rates actively in the preceding period as well. In fact, given the fact that the CBRT abandoned its regulatory controls on the capital markets after the onset of deregulation, the Bank's overnight interest rates had always been an important indicator of its monetary policy even before 2002.
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However, there exist different overnight interest rate data such as "selling" and "buying" rates.
To obtain a single data set on the O/N rates, we used weighted averages of the realized interest rate data obtained from the Bank's data sources. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 1 above, the interest rates display abnormal hikes around April 1994, December 2000, and we created monthly series by using a linear transformation based on linearly gradual decreasing gap between previous year's inflation target and the current year's inflation target. Given that the central banks would tend to raise interest rates to curb inflationary pressures, if the expected inflation rate is greater than the targeted inflation rate, the expected sign of the inflation coefficient is negative.
In order to account for the output gap, we used the GDP data (calculated from the production side with constant 1987 prices). To obtain the GDP gap we created a production index. To solve the seasonality problem we first used the X11 method and then obtained the potential GDP by using the classical Hodrick-Prescott filter. The expected sign of the coefficient is negative because a central bank is supposed to decrease its interest rates in response to higher GDP gap.
In most of the "simple" versions of the TR equations, only the inflation rate and income gap variables were commonly used as explanatory variables. In its more modern treatment the nominal interest rate in lag form has become a standard component of the TR equations which we regard as an indication of the interest rate smoothing practices of central banks. indicates the interest rate smoothing of a central bank. Although this method is very appealing because of its partial adjustment nature and easiness we do not prefer to use this method. Because, this method assumes that there are desired interest rates which can be obtained from a Taylor type of reaction function. However, first, in general, central banks may not have desired interest rates in their mind. Second, even if they have desired rates in their mind we do not believe that a central bank reaction function can give us these desired rates. Because it requires that a central bank's decisions are mostly driven by a Taylor type framework. As we pointed out we only want to use a reaction function to assess the sensitiveness of a central bank to different macroeconomic indicators. And, as opposed to those who used this method we do not start with a claim that central banks significantly utilize a Taylor type of monetary Rule in their decision making procedure.
Similarly, it can be claimed that the current account balance and unemployment rate can exert influence on central bank's decision. However, depreciation and income gap variables traditionally lead to strong proxies respectively for variables accounting for the current account deficit and unemployment. Additions of these variables into the augmented TR equation inevitably may lead to econometrics problems such as multicollinearity. Hence, we excluded them from our analytical equation above.
We used explanatory variables in lag forms The logic behind this rests on the observation that the information about the current main macroeconomic indicators especially about the inflation rate and income gap is available to the central banks only in lagged fashion.
Furthermore, using lag form may prevent us from facing endogeneity problem which may distorts the result significantly.
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IV-2. Regression Results
We first checked different regression specifications for the whole period by using the Ordinary Least Squares method with the Newey-West procedure in order to dissect possible problems of heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation.
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In the literature, Taylor type of regression results have been criticized because of the ignorance of the stability of the variables used in the regressions Osterholm (2003) . Hence, before running regressions we checked if variables have unit root problems. However, unit root tests notoriously demonstrate lack of statistical power. So, we employed three different unit root tests for the whole period and sub-periods to decide if our variables suffer from unit root problems. Specifically, these tests are: Agumented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips Perron (P-P) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test statistics. We considered a variable has a unit root problem if, at least, two of the tests indicate existing of unit root problem. Results can be seen in Table 1 . For the whole period, ADF and P-P tests suggest that the "Federal Reserve rate" variable has unit root problem. On the other hand, although, none of the variables have unit root problem in the first sub-period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ) the "the interest rate", the "Federal 16 Many studies which used current values of these variables have been criticized on the ground that central banks do not have the data concerning some variables like inflation rate until at the end of the month. 17 We first started without any correction of heterosclasticity and autocorrelation. However, in most cases we faced unknown characteristics of heterosclaticity and autocorrelation problems. Hence, it seems to be reasonable to use Newey-West procedure not to bother about these econometric problems.
Reserve rate", and the "targeted-expected inflation" variables have unit root problems in the second sub-period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) .
We utilized three different estimation strategies to avoid falling to the trap of spurious regression problem whenever we have a unit root problem. This can also enable us to have a more robust picture of the Bank's interest rate policy. First we run regressions by using levels of all variables as if none of them has unit root problem. Second, we used the differences of the variables, which have unit root problems, with the levels of other variables in the regression. In this case, the coefficients of the variable used in difference form can be interpreted as a shortterm, rather than long-term relationships. Using levels and differences in a regression may not be regarded ideal; hence, we also run a regression by using the differences of the all variables.
This makes the interpretation of the coefficients a bit more complex than that of in the regressions with levels. 18 However, several different studies used changes of the variables to assess central banks' interest policy. For example, Sinclair (2005) utilizes this strategy to investigate the relationship between the changes in a set of macroeconomic variables and the change in interest rate policy in developing countries. And, as we pointed out, this can give us a more robust picture.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 display the results of the regressions with levels for the entire period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . The "inflation" and "interest rate" variables are significant at 1 percent significance level in the first specification. As can be seen in Column 2, when we add the "Federal reserve rate" and "depreciation" variables, the "depreciation" variable became significant at 1 per cent significance level as well. This result did not change when we used the change of the "Federal reserve rate" (see column 3). Table 3 displays the results for the entire period when we use changes instead of levels of all variables. The coefficient of change in interest rate continues to be significant at 1 percent, while the coefficient of change in inflation variable is significant at 5 percent level. 19 Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficients of change in inflation and change in interest rate means that the Bank had a tendency to decrease the difference between the current and previous interest rates in response to increase in the change of lag interest variable and inflation variable. In fact, as we will see later, this result is dominated by high levels of interest rates in the first period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) rather than the second period.
The most obvious factor affecting the CBRT's interest rate behavior seems to be the direction of the preceding period's interest rate if we treat the era spanning from 1994 to 2007 as one single period. The CBRT seems to be unresponsiveness to change in the national income.
Inflation and the depreciation of exchange rates seem to be among determinants of interest rate policy of the Bank although relative size of the coefficients of these variables are very small compared to the interest rate smoothing coefficient. Indeed. The low coefficients of other variables are among the indicators of interest rate smoothing.
However, we prefer to abstain from making generalizations of these results for the whole period given that there had been significant structural shifts over Thereby, ideally, we should divide our whole sample into three sub-samples namely 1994-1999, 2000-2001 and 2002-2007 . However, the very small number of the degrees of freedom may cause high standard deviation and, in turn, lead to insignificant coefficients even if the explanatory variables would have some role in determining the Bank's interest rate.
Furthermore, autocorrelation and unit root problems may exacerbate the situation. Therefore, we excluded the period of 2000-2001 from our analysis. In other words, we have mainly checked the Bank's interest rate policy in the two sub-periods namely, 1994-1999 and 2002-2007 . It can further be argued that using lag inflation as an explanatory variable can be misleading to explain the behavior of a central bank under the inflation targeting regime because central banks generally may consider the deviation between targeted inflation rate and expected inflation rate when they implement an inflation targeting strategy. Hence, in the second period, we further checked whether our results would alter when we make use of the "targeted inflation minus expected inflation" as an explanatory variable instead of the lagged inflation rate
First, we will discuss the econometric results for the first sub-period. All variables are stationary in this period (see the Column 2 in Table 1 ). Hence, we will only use regressions with levels of the variables. The results of the regressions can be seen in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 ). As can be seen in Column 1, the only significant coefficients under the reduced form specification are the coefficients of the lagged interest rate variable and the constant term. None of the remaining variables are significant. 21 In this sense, interestingly, the Bank's interest rate does not seem to be responsive developments in important macroeconomic variables.
According to these results interest rate smoothing has been the main determinants of the CBRT's interest rate policy in the period from 1994 to 1999.
Secondly, we will discuss the implicit inflation targeting period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . As we pointed out before, we utilized two slightly different regression specifications for this period.
First, we modeled a regression specification with the lagged inflation rate. Here, the interest rate and the Federal Reserve data have unit root problems order of 1. Column 1 and 2 in Table 5 display the regression results when we make use of the lagged interest rate as the inflation variable and using levels of all variables. It is very clear that there is a very strong interest rate smoothing tendency in this period. The constant term and the "lagged interest rate" are only significant variables in Column 1. When we add "depreciation" and "Federal reserve rate" variables to our base regression both variables turn out to be significant as well. However, the coefficient of "lag inflation rate" is very small with a "wrong" sign, although the pair wise correlation between lag inflation rate and interest rate indicates high positive correlation between these two variables. Table 5 ). These findings are supported by the regression specification with changes of all variables instead of levels. Table   6 indicates that the constant term and the coefficient of change in the lag depreciation rate are significant at 10 percent significance level, the coefficient of change in lag interest rate and lag inflation are significant at 1 percent significant level.
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To summarize our results with the lag inflation variable for the period of 2002-2007, the most robust findings are that the Bank's interest rate smoothing tendency remains as the main determinant of its interest rate policy in this period. In this sense, larger lag interest rate coefficients compared to the preceding period suggest that interest rate smoothing has become an even more important consideration under the new regime. The Bank's response to inflation seems to be also an important factor which is in line with the inflation targeting regime.
Furthermore, surprisingly depreciation seems to be one of the considerations even under flexible exchange rate regime although the magnitude of the related coefficient is not very big.
As we pointed, we also run a set of regressions by utilizing expected inflation minus targeted inflation as the explanatory inflation variable instead of lag inflation variable to be able to capture the possibility that central banks may be concerned more with the difference of the 22 The pair-wise correlation between interest rate and lag inflation is 0.923 and the correlation between inflation and lag interest rate is 0.925. Hence, it is normal to assume the multi co-linearity is caused by the existence of lag interest variable with lag inflation rate. In other words, regression results may not differentiate the impact of lag inflation rate and lag interest rate on the Central Bank's policy. 23 The positive sign of the coefficient of change in interest lag indicates that interest rate smoothing is much more apparent in this period which could be made possible by low levels and decreasing trend in interest rates in this period.
expected and the targeted inflation rates, as some of the inflation targeting literature suggests.
When we look at results from a regression specification with levels, the coefficient of the interest rate smoothing is significant at 1 percent significance level and very high (see column 1 in Table7 ). As can be seen from column 2 in Table 7 depreciation and Federal Reserve rate variables are significant as well when we add them to the regression. However, unit root problems and multi-colinearity problems can distort these results. In fact, at a glance, we seem to have very similar problems as in the case of the preceding one. Lag inflation variable (targeted inflation variable minus expected inflation) is very small and has a wrong sign although the pair-wise correlation between inflation variable and interest rate is very high with a negative sign. Again, with a very high R-squared this is indicative of a multi co-linearity problem. So, we applied the same procedure as above. When we exclude the lag interest rate from the regression, the coefficient of lag inflation became significant at 1 percent level with an expected sign. 24 However, this result may not be robust because inflation, interest rate, and the Federal Reserve rate data have unit root problems. To address this issue we used the differences of the variables suffering from unit root problems. Results can be seen in column 4 Table 7 .
Under this specification, again, the interest smoothing variable is significant at 1 percent significance level. And the exchange rate depreciation variable is significant at 10 percent significance level although the coefficient of this variable is negligibly small. When we look at the results from the regression specification with the differences of all variables the picture did not change at all (see Table 8 ). Hence, for this case, the relationship between interest rates and inflation; interest rates and Federal Reserve rate are not robust.
Over the period 2002 to the end of 2007, whether we use the "lagged inflation rate" or the "expected minus the targeted inflation" as the relevant (explanatory) variable of "inflation", the most robust conclusion is that the Bank's interest rate smoothing tendency seemed to continue with an increasing magnitude and the Bank did not take developments in the business cycles into consideration in determining its interest rate policy. Surprisingly the lagged inflation, rather than the "expected minus targeted inflation rate" seems to be a robust determinant of interest rate decisions of the Bank. Furthermore, there is some econometric 24 Furthermore, in this specification Federal Reserve rate is also significant at 10 percent level. But it has a wrong sign.
evidence that nominal exchange rate depreciation influences the Bank's interest rate policy, although the magnitude of the coefficient of this variable turns out to be very small.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper we studied how the interest rate policy of the Central bank of the Republic of finding is that the income gap variable was not significant in any of our specifications. Hence, It can be argued that over such an extended time horizon during when significant shifts in the macroeconomic environment have occurred, the CBRT's almost exclusive focus on "interest rate smoothing" has not changed; and the Bank persistently ignored (or had to ignore) the developments in income gap in designing its interest rate policy. These results are statistically significant in all cases and in all periodizations and robust to a large range of different specifications.
It can be argued that in general, under the constraints of the global financial markets,
The Turkish central bank was conditioned to following an interest rate smoothing strategy for at least three reasons. First of all, rising volatility along with associated uncertainty and fragility might make it almost impossible to determine the true picture of the economy. Secondly, related to the first, the Turkish Central Bank has several times only passively responded to shocks to the economy, as it probably was not "confident" about the outcomes of its policies (reaction of markets). Trying to keep interest rates constant for a sufficiently long time can thus be seen as a remedy against this self-acclaimed non-assurance and protecting so called credibility. Thirdly, even when the Bank correctly estimated the situation, its instruments might be ineffective, and could not change the direction of the economy. So, the Bank might surrender the pressure of domestic and international markets.
Given these structural constraints of financialization as such, we argue that with the advent of free capital mobility, CBs have lost their autonomy in deploying the exchange rate or the interest rate as strategic instruments for achieving objectives of growth, employment and macro stability. In an uncertain characterized by massive capital mobility, the alleged "independence" of the CBs means little beyond "ineptedness". 
